Language and Economics: Grice’s Principles and Pragmatics
Introducing the Linguistic Luminary
During my reading of ‘Economics and Language: Five Essays’ by ARIEL RUBINSTEIN (Tel Aviv University, Princeton University), published by Cambridge University Press, and with ‘The Churchill Lectures in Economic Theory’ written on the cover, I came across citations and ideas from Grice. I had never heard that name before, and it piqued my interest, leading me to start exploring his writings. Herbert Paul Grice, an intriguing linguist and a brilliant philosopher.
Imagine language as a playground where words not only convey meaning but also dance with subtleties. A communicative implicature, this linguistic hidden gem, is like a secret handshake between words and tone — grasped not just from what’s spoken but how it’s sung. Most of us unwittingly navigate this linguistic dance floor daily. For instance, when you’re asked, ‘Could you close the door?’ the unspoken melody is ‘Please, close the door,’ inviting you to perform the graceful act of door-shutting without a formal ‘yes’ or ‘no.’
Enter Grice, the language maestro who first spotted this choreography. He unravelled the cooperative ballet of conversations, unveiling the Principle of Cooperation: ‘Your words should sway in harmony with the shared goals of this dialogue.’ It’s a philosophy that echoes through the conversations we have, guiding the rhythm of our words. Grice delved deeper, spotlighting four pillars of this linguistic ballet: Quantity, Quality, Relationship, and Method. Each of these pillars houses its unique commandments. ‘Speak enough, but not too much,’ whispers the Quantity pillar, urging us to match our words to the moment’s needs. Meanwhile, the Quality pillar advises, ‘Make your words ring true.’
Yet, in this dance of words, contradictions twirl and pirouette. Sometimes, one dancer overshadows another — Quantity and Quality in a tango of discourse. Imagine a dialogue waltzing along: — ‘Would you share your journey from the station?’ — ‘On foot.’
With each conversation, we’re composing our linguistic sonnet, subtly blending truth, relevance, clarity, and conciseness. A symphony of communication, where harmony and dissonance are the twin dancers, shaping the rhythm of our understanding.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Herbert Paul Grice (13 March 1913–28 August 1988), a name synonymous with groundbreaking contributions to the world of language and philosophy. Familiar to the scholarly realm under aliases like H. P. Grice, H. Paul Grice, and Paul Grice, this British thinker was no ordinary philosopher. He was a mastermind, laying the foundation for key linguistic concepts, including implicature theory and the cooperative principle with its renowned Gricean maxims. These concepts are the very building blocks of pragmatics, revolutionizing how we decipher the intricate language codes.
Imagine Grice’s early days in the quaint British suburb of Harborne, near Birmingham. The trajectory of his academic journey began at Clifton College and later flourished at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where his fascination with the nuances of language took root. From teaching stints to gallant service in the Royal Navy during World War II, Grice’s life reads like a captivating tale.
After the war, academia beckoned, and Grice answered by returning to Oxford. His academic sojourn included pivotal roles as a graduate student at Merton College and later as a Lecturer and Fellow at St John’s College. In 1967, the academic adventurer set sail for the United States, accepting a prestigious professorship at the University of California, Berkeley. However, the call of his homeland proved too strong to resist, leading to his return in 1979 to enthral audiences with the John Locke lectures on ‘Aspects of Reason.’
Beyond the scholarly accolades, Grice was a man of many dimensions — a philosopher, a linguist, and a devoted family man. Beyond the ivory tower, he cherished family, tying the knot with Kathleen Watson in 1942 and celebrating the joy of two wonderful children. Even after his passing in 1988, Grice’s linguistic legacy lived on through his posthumous gem, ‘Studies in the Way of Words’ (1989), a repository of profound insights and thought-provoking essays. Herbert Paul Grice, a virtuoso in the language symphony, etched an everlasting mark on the world of linguistics and beyond. Stay tuned for more deep dives into the minds that shaped the realm of science and knowledge.
PRAGMATICS
The exploration of languages traditionally involves delving into three distinct domains: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax dissects language as a system of symbols, devoid of their contextual interpretation. Semantics, on the other hand, focuses on the rules that govern the assignment of meaning to a sentence, irrespective of the situational backdrop in which the sentence is spoken.
Pragmatics, a pivotal domain, delves into how the context in which an utterance is made influences its interpretation. An “utterance” is perceived as a signal conveying information within a specific context, which includes factors like the speaker, the listener, the location, the time, and more. Understanding how the listener perceives the speaker’s intentions and how the speaker regards the listener’s presuppositions becomes crucial in interpreting an utterance effectively. Hence, one can visualize the comprehension of an utterance, in terms of game theory, as the equilibrium outcome in a linguistic ‘game’ played among speakers of a language.
GRICE’s SOME WRITINGS
One of Grice’s paramount contributions to the realms of philosophy and linguistics lies in his groundbreaking theory of implicature. This theory emerged prominently in two pivotal works: the 1961 article titled “The Causal Theory of Perception,” and the impactful “Logic and Conversation” presented during Harvard’s ‘William James Lectures’ in 1967. The latter was subsequently published as a chapter in volume 3 of “Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts” in 1975, solidifying its impact and influence.
- 1941, “Personal Identity,” Mind 50, 330–350; reprinted in J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, pp. 73–95.
- 1957, “Meaning,” The Philosophical Review 66: 377–88.
- 1961, “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 (suppl.), 121–52.
- 1968, “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Word Meaning,” Foundations of Language 4, 225–242.
- 1969, “Vacuous Names,” in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 118–145.
- 1969, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intention,” The Philosophical Review 78: 147–77.
- 1971, “Intention and Uncertainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, pp. 263–279.
- 1975, “Method in Philosophical Psychology: From the Banal to the Bizarre,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1975), pp. 23–53.
- 1975, “Logic and conversation,” In Cole, P. and Morgan, J. (eds.) Syntax and semantics, vol 3. New York: Academic Press.
- 1978, “Further Notes on Logic and Conversation,” in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York, pp. 113–128.
- 1981, “Presupposition and Conversational Implicature,” in P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York, pp. 183–198.
- 1989, “Studies in the Way of Words,” Harvard University Press.
- 1991, “The Conception of Value,” Oxford University Press. His 1979 John Locke Lectures.
- 2001, “Aspects of Reason,” (Richard Warner, ed.). Oxford University Press.
P.S. IS GRICE WRONG?
Since Grice’s theory inception, numerous new theories have emerged as alternatives or refinements to his work.
Some propose alternatives, challenging parts of Grice’s theory, while others, known as “neo-Gricean” theories, build upon Grice’s foundation while refining or simplifying certain aspects. Among these, a notable neo-Gricean idea simplifies Gricean maxims into a smaller set of principles, shedding light on previously implicit points.
Recall that a key part of Grice’s theory is the Cooperative Principle, which breaks down into conversational maxims. These maxims are generally grouped into four: Quality, Quantity, Manner, and Relation. However, these can sometimes be challenging to distinguish and violations may not always align with a specific maxim.
In the 1980s, neo-Gricean pragmaticists aimed to streamline this by condensing the maxims into a few core principles under the Cooperative Principle. This departure led to influential theories by Laurence Horn and Stephen Levinson, prominent figures in neo-Gricean pragmatics. Horn’s Q-principle (for “quantity”) and R-principle (for “relation”) and Levinson’s Q (again for “quantity”) and I (for “informativeness”) principles emerged, focusing on achieving a balance between informativeness and relevance.
Both systems center on the idea of speakers balancing two conflicting goals: being informative yet not overloading with irrelevant information. The Q-principle advocates for sharing as much relevant information as possible, while the I-principle emphasizes keeping information both relevant and necessary. Balancing these, finding the “Goldilocks” level of informativeness, is crucial.
These principles guide speakers but also inform listeners, assuming the speaker adheres to them. For instance, following the Q-principle suggests that unsaid information may not be considered true or relevant, while adhering to the I-principle implies enriching what is said to ensure relevance and informativeness, aligning with the speaker’s intent. This mirrors the conflict resolution seen in Optimality Theory in phonology, showcasing how neo-Gricean pragmatics delineates meaning by navigating the interplay between the Q- and I-principles.
Q-implicatures vs. I-implicatures
The Q-principle explains scalar implicatures, where saying “Josh is smart” might imply that the speaker doesn’t think Josh is brilliant. If the speaker followed the Q-principle and believed Josh was brilliant, they would say so. The I-principle, on the other hand, accounts for various implicatures that enrich vague utterances. For example, in the phrase “Sammy and Chris fell in love and got married,” the order of events is implied (love before marriage) based on the I-principle. These principles help achieve the right balance between being informative and relevant in a conversation.
Interestingly, Q-implicatures tend to negate other propositions (e.g., not believing Josh is brilliant), while I-implicatures add extra information (e.g., inferring the order of events). Another distinction lies in how they respond to metalinguistic negation. Q-implicatures can be canceled by it, but I-implicatures are not as affected.
While these neo-Gricean concepts may not always be heavily used, they shed light on critical ideas. They emphasize that implicatures can function differently, either by rejecting unsaid alternatives (Q-implicatures) or by enriching the meaning with additional information (I-implicatures). Additionally, they underline the perpetual challenge speakers and listeners face in deciding how much to convey during a conversation, a fundamental aspect of understanding implicatures. The research on neo-Gricean pragmatics has significantly contributed to comprehending implicatures and identifying key issues in the field, such as scalar implicatures and clausal implicatures.
SUMMARY
In summary, Grice’s theory of implicature, a cornerstone in philosophy and linguistics, is encapsulated by the Cooperative Principle, which encompasses conversational maxims focusing on Quality, Quantity, Manner, and Relation. However, implementing these maxims can be intricate, leading to the development of neo-Gricean principles.
Two significant neo-Gricean principles, the Q-principle and the I-principle, offer insights into implicature dynamics. The Q-principle emphasizes informativeness without overload, while the I-principle enriches meaning by adding relevant details. This dichotomy between negation and strengthening reveals different types of implicatures. Q-implicatures typically negate propositions, while I-implicatures enrich the existing information.
Though not always at the forefront of pragmatic analysis, neo-Gricean concepts illuminate essential ideas. They underscore the diverse functions of implicatures and the perpetual struggle for balance between informativeness and relevance in communication, offering valuable insights into the understanding of pragmatic phenomena.